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We present a first analysis of auction markets for specialty food products. We identify auction 
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a one-month period. Applying hedonic modeling, we examine potential factors that may 
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effects for weight, bidding activity, and auction length, that the domestic product is sold at a 
discount, that higher shipping cost have a negative impact on final prices, and that auctions 
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three specialty hams (Prosciutto di Parma, Jamón Serrano, Schwarzwälder). 
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In general, auctions are a useful mechanism for sellers to ensure they get the highest price for 
their good without jeopardizing the trade through a fixed price set too high. Internet auctions have 
become a fascinating new type of exchange mechanism. Every day millions of different auctions take 
place online, for diverse goods ranging from antique furniture to zoom lenses. Internet auctions have 
significantly lowered the costs for seller to organize and for bidders to participate in auctions. Indeed, 
low costs appear to be the reason why auctions are used more and more often and for an ever broader 
range of goods. eBay is the leading internet auction site and has become synonymous for trading goods 
online. There are limited possibilities for online traders to sell food due to their often perishable nature 
and that the produce usually must be shipped to the buyer. In principle, less perishable food products 
as well as alcoholic beverages should be more suited for online trading. In fact, there is a relatively 
large market for gourmet products such as smoked ham, dried cheese, wine and spirits on the German 
eBay site, which is by far greater than comparable markets in other European countries and the United 
States.  Alcoholic beverages (wine and spirits) are the most active gourmet categories on the German 
eBay site with over 12,000 listings of single bottles or bundles at any given time. 
 
Due to their rising popularity, online auctions have also captured significant media attention as 
well as the interest of science. In particular, they represent a rich subject of study for economists who 
wish to understand how this new exchange mechanism works in practice. Online auctions have several 
benefits relative to traditional auctions. First, they offer a much more convenient way for buyers to 
place their bids, both geographic and temporal. Instead of physically visiting an auction house to 
participate in the bidding, potential buyers need not go anywhere. Traditional auctions require all 
bidders to participate at the same time (synchronous bidding), tying each bidder up for the entire 
length of the auction. Internet auctions typically have asynchronous bidding lasting for several days or 
weeks, giving bidders much more flexibility about when to submit their bids. Increased convenience 
also benefits the seller by creating a larger market for the goods being auctioned. Online traders can 
easily reach a large group of bidders on short notice, rather than scheduling an auction a month in 
advance and being restricted to local bidders who could travel to the auction at the scheduled time. Furthermore, categorical listings for browsing and search engines make it very convenient for bidders 
to find the goods they are looking for. 
However, internet auctions also have disadvantages relative to in-person auctions. First, it is 
hard for bidders to inspect the goods before placing a bid. Online auctioneers try to mitigate this 
problem by using technology in several ways: sellers may post electronic images and/or provide text 
descriptions of their items as well as answer buyers’ questions via email. Buyers also have reasons to 
be distrustful of any claims made by sellers. This is obvious when bidders are better informed about 
the value of a good than its seller. Even if sellers know the value buyers place on their goods, in a 
search equilibrium there is little reason to expect that sellers of low value goods will truthfully 
advertise themselves as such. This is because doing so will reduce the probability of a successful 
transaction, as search effort is costly and buyers exert less effort in pursuit of sellers advertising low 
quality. Another potential problem with online auctions is fraud. With traditional auctions, the goods 
can be exchanged directly for money. With Internet auctions, winning bidders must trust that the seller 
actually sends the good in return for their payment. Indeed, there have been reported cases of fraud in 
online auctions, but the numbers are tiny compared to the transactions taking place.  
 
Apart from traditional auctions, another point of comparison for online auctions are newspaper 
advertisements. Many of the items sold by in online auction are similar to items found in newspaper 
ads. In fact, online auctions can also be cheaper than a traditional newspaper ad (partly because online 
listings are do-it-yourself, thus saving labor costs). By matching buyers and sellers, online auctions can 
improve efficiency: items which may not be sold for a lack of local interest, can now find their way to 
distant buyers. Further, by using an auction, the seller is relieved of the responsibility of choosing a 
price for an item with uncertain demand. Rather than setting a price too-low which will allocate the 
good to the first person calling, or setting the price too-high such that the good cannot be unsold, the 
seller can use an auction and let the market determine the price.  
 
In what follows, we present an introduction to the online auction market, paying particular 
attention to features that may be of interest to agricultural economists. What  types of food products 
are sold in online auctions, what is the volume of trade, and what types of auction formats used? The 
rates of change in this dynamic market imply that we may only give a snapshot at a particular point in 
time. We will examine online auction markets for selected food items during the months of December 
2004 and January 2005 and present data on from the German eBay site collected during that time 
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auction literature with a focus on recent work related to online auctions. Moreover, we discuss the 
auction format typically used in online auctions. In Section 3, we provide a brief overview of the types 
of food products that are sold in online auctions. Section 4 introduces our data set for three specialty 
hams (Parma, Serrano, and Schwarzwälder) protected geographical indications (GIs) in the European 
Union, which are auctioned on the German eBay site. The modeling approach is used to analyze online 
auction pricing, but also serves as a tool to estimate the value of geographical indications (GIs). In 
section 5, we present the results of an empirical analysis using a hedonic model to analyze potential 
factors that influence online buying behavior and final auction prices. In Section 6, we summarize and 
discuss the results and then conclude. 
 
 
2. The (Online-)Auction Literature 
 
Auctions have been extensively studied by economists to understand their properties as a 
dynamic pricing mechanism (e.g. Vickrey, 1961; Milgrom and Weber, 1982; McAfee and McMillan, 
1997). This literature involves both analytical models and empirical testing. The different auction 
mechanisms studied include the English auction (or ascending-bid auction), the Dutch auction 
(descending-bid auction), the first-price sealed-bid auction, and the Vickrey auction (second-price 
sealed-bid auction). For a comprehensive and in depth overview of the literature on auction theory we 
refer to Klemperer (1999). 
 
Ascending-bid online auctions are by far the most common. To set up such an auction, the 
seller must always provide verbal description of the item and may also upload a digital picture for 
display. When listing the item, an online webpage is created that displays the information provided by 
the seller along with the current high bid. Potential bidders must decide whether to place the first bid 
and/or to raise the current high bid. This can be done by filing an online bid into a text box shown on 
the same web page. After submitting their bid, the auction status will automatically update and show 
whether the submitted bid has been successful, i.e. has become the current high bid. Bidders may then 
return at any time before the auction closes to check on the current status. In order to make bidding 
easy for its users, eBay provides a list of all auctions in which you have place a bid and allows you to 
create a list of all auction in which you are interested in and may want to place a bid in the future. It 
will also notify you instantly via email when your current bid is no longer the highest.  
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the auctioneer uses the familiar “it's going.. it's going.. it's gone” procedure to close the auction. Since 
bidders need not be present in one geographical location, online auctions provide an extended temporal 
horizon for them to place their bids. In any standard eBay auction, the seller must decide on a specific 
auction length (up to ten days) and starting time, which will define the exact closing time and day in 
advance. The literature has noted that this leads to a severe incentive problem: if the auction closes at a 
fixed time, bidders have no incentive to place an early bid in the auction (e.g. Roth and Ockenfels, 
2002). Many bidders in eBay auctions engage as “snipers” (i.e. filing a bid which just barely beats the 
high bid in the final minute of an auction leaving no time to respond for other bidders). The strategy of 
filing a late bid just before the auction ends dominates the strategy of filing the same bid somewhat 
earlier. When all bidders follow this strategy, the bidding game becomes equivalent to a first-price, 
sealed-bid auction, where all bids are submitted at the very end. This will effectively eliminate the 
most attractive feature of any ascending-bid auction, i.e. that bidders have a dominant strategy to bid 
up to their maximum willingness to pay. In order to restore this attractive feature, two alternative 
mechanisms have been suggested to encourage earlier bidding in ascending-bid online auctions.  
 
The first mechanism is an "it's going.. it's going.. it's gone" procedure to the auction, involving 
a short “temporal extension” of say ten minutes. It means that any bid placed in the last ten minutes of 
an auction will extend the auction's length by another ten minutes. Hence, an auction does not end 
until ten minutes have passed without a new bid, giving bidders an opportunity to protect themselves 
against “snipers.” However, now the problem is that serious bidders must visit the auction during the 
final minutes and stay with it until it is over, effectively removing the flexibility for bidders to enter 
their bids at any time during the auction period. Lengthening the extension period would counter this 
temporal bidding inconvenience, but at the cost of having an unpredictable auction ending time. 
 
A second mechanism involves so-called “proxy bidding,” making the fixed-length ascending-
bid online auction somewhat equivalent to a Vickrey second-price sealed-bid auction. However, it 
implicitly assumes a private-value auction-bidding model where bidders know with certainty their own 
valuation for an item. Note that this equivalence does not apply to other auction models such as 
Milgrom and Weber's (1982) affiliated-values model, which do not imply a strict equivalence between 
English and second-price sealed-bid auctions. Proxy bidding works as follows: Bidders are strongly 
encouraged to always place a bid up to their maximum willingness to pay. However, the current high 
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Hence, when you are the current high bidder, your maximum bid which is unknown to the other 
bidders may be much higher. Other bidders who place a bid that is just above the current high bid do 
not know whether they get the winning bid. Moreover, snipers who file a bid which barely beats the 
current high bid in the final minute of an auction may still not get the winning bid. Hence, this 
mechanism will eliminate incentives for “sniping” and restore the dominant strategy of bidding one’s 
maximum willingness to pay. 
 
In markets with asymmetric information properties, economists worry about adverse selection 
(i.e. sellers may have hidden information about the quality of the good). Akerlof (1970) is pessimistic 
about whether markets are able to function with adverse selection. He demonstrates that when only the 
seller knows whether a used car is a “lemon” at the time of sale, it could be that there is no equilibrium 
where cars are being sold. Other authors (e.g. Shapiro 1983) have suggested that reputation indicators 
might be a mechanism that allows markets to function in the presence of adverse selection. If sellers 
gain a reputation for honest behavior, such as making full disclosure of all information about a 
particular product, then markets can have a positive level of trade. All online auction sites attempt to 
solve this information problem through some form of a user feedback system. For instance, after an 
auction is completed, eBay allows both the seller as well as the winning buyer to rate one another in 
terms of their reliability and timeliness in payment and delivery. The ratings are given as a positive, 
negative or neutral response. The number of net positive responses is the seller reputation score 
displayed next to each user's eBay identity, which is usually a pseudonym or nickname. By clicking on 
a seller's eBay ID, potential buyers can view all of the seller's feedback, including all comments as 
well as statistics totaling the total number of positive, neutral and negative comments. 
 
Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) provide an excellent overview of the recent literature on online 
auctions. Their paper also includes a review of studies that have used data collected directly from 
online auction sites to analyze customer-bidding behavior. Lucking-Reiley (2000) present an overview 
of what is auctioned online and how is auctioned off. Lucking-Reiley et al (2000) analyze online 
auction prices for collectible one-cent coins on eBay.  Their main findings are that the user reputation 
indicator (i.e. feedback ratings) have a measurable effect on auction prices (negative ratings have a 
much greater impact than positive ratings), minimum bids and reserve prices have positive effects on 
the final auction price, and that on average longer lasting auctions result in significantly higher prices. 
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studies also provide estimates for the value of reputation in online auctions (e.g. Houser and Wooders, 
2000; Lucking-Reiley et al., 2000). A common finding by all authors is that any negative feedback 
(user reputation) is negatively correlated with the sale price and that the amount of positive feedback 
has a significant positive impact on the sale price. However, the estimates on how much the winning 
bid would increase as a function of a seller reputation are rather small. Houser and Wooders (2000) 
estimate that a ten percent increase in positive feedback points increases the winning bid by only 
0.17% and a ten percent increase in negative comments reduces the sale price by 0.24%. Lucking-
Reiley et al. (2000) find that a one percent increase in the seller’s positive feedback raises prices by 
0.03% and a one percent increase in negative feedback decreases prices by 11%. 
 
Wilcox (2000) found that more experienced bidders tend to bid more rationally than less 
experienced bidders. Analyzing eBay data for rare coins, Wood and Kauffman (2001) identified four 
trends that may explain why auction buyers pay more or less for the same item: weekend, auction 
length, reputation score, and picture effects. Auctions ending during the weekend yielded higher prices 
than auctions ending on weekdays (weekend effect). Thus, a weekend effect would be a personal 
characteristic, not a market characteristic and may indicate that people are willing to pay more for the 
same item when they have more time to consider the purchase. Auctions that last longer attract more 
bidders and thus higher prices (auction length effect). Seller reputation may also yield a price premium 
(reputation score effect). However, since eBay reputation scores tend to increase with time and activity 
it may in fact measure experience rather than reputation.  Moreover, Wood and Kauffman (2001) 
suggest that items sold online and shown with an actual picture might also sell for a premium (picture 
effect). As they suggest that this might be due to demanding buyers who expect sellers to present all 
information available using advanced technology. We would argue that this might no longer be 
accurate since digital imaging has become almost an everyday household application today. 
 
In addition to the online specific indicators analyzed in other studies, we take a closer look at 
the effects of the auction ending time during the day on the final bids.  We argue that the timing of the 
final bid by the seller has received relatively little attention in the literature. Analyzing buyer behavior, 
Roth and Ockenfels (2002) have examined the phenomenon that experienced buyers tend to bid during 
the very final phase of an eBay auction (sniping). Moreover, we also examine an array of distinct 
product quality attributes, which have been analyzed in hedonic models using retail prices. We will 
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render most online specific variables to have insignificant impacts on final auction prices. Our 
application is unique in scope and detail because online specific variables have not been analyzed in 
conjunction with product quality attributes typically examined in hedonic models using retail prices. 
 
3. Online Food Auctions 
 
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the types of food products that are available in 
online auction markets. For this purpose, we compare the two largest eBay sites worldwide: Germany 
and the United States.  Table 1 lists the main gourmet food/beverage categories along with a simple 
offer count on December 21
st 2004 and on January 25
th 2005. Although the overall eBay market in 
terms of the total number of items on offer at any given time is about 2½ times larger in the U.S., there 
are about 3 times more listings in the gourmet food/beverage categories on the German site.  
 
Table 1. eBay Gourmet Food/Beverage Categories. 
Germany (ebay.de) 2004 2005 %  U.S.A. (ebay.com) 2004 2005 %
Gourmet 21.12.  25.1.   +/-  Food & Wine   21.12.  25.1.  +/-
Sweets & Chocolates  1,848  2,760 49%  Candy, Chocolate   1,626  2,112 30%
Breads, Cakes & Cookies  379  416 10%  Cereals, Grains, Pasta   93  121 30%
Cheese  526  575 9%  Cheese, Crackers   59  94 59%
Coffee  2,001  2,424 21%  Coffee, Tea   1,991  2,371 19%
Non-Alcoholic Beverages  281  398 42%  Cookies, Biscotti   243  295 21%
Champagne/Sparkling Wine  902  779 -14% Desserts    472  484 3%
Fruits & Vegetables  223  271 22%  Fruit, Nuts, Seeds   260  274 5%
Alcohol Beverage & Spirits  4,317  4,886 13%  Honey, Syrup / Sweetener  193  224 16%
Asian Food  322  376 17%  International Foods   168  244 45%
Basic & Specialty Food  2,025  2,056 2%  Jams, Jellies & Preserves   161  112 -30%
Meats & Sausages  1,783  1,779 0%  Meat, Poultry & Seafood   685  555 -19%
Fish & Seafood  464  496 7%  Oils, Condiments & Sauces  599  676 13%
Tea  1,317  1,423 8%  Soups, Stews   67  77 15%
Spices & Seasonings  1,367  1,468 7%  Spices & Seasonings   1,046  1,112 6%
Wine 7,917  8,454 7%  Wine    413  340 -18%
Cigars & Tobacco  1,642  2,063 26%  Other Food   556  1,097 97%
Total 27,314  30,624 12%  Total 8,632  10,188 18%
 Source: www.eBay.de and www.ebay.com with own calculations. 
 
 
In terms of the overall importance among all product categories, the gourmet food/beverage 
categories are minor. However, these auction markets are very dynamic and exhibited significant 
growth rates for most categories over the period that we observed. Nevertheless, only about 1% of all 
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than 1‰. Therefore, we restrict our more detailed analysis to the listings on the German eBay site, 
where wine is by far the most important product categories with over 8,000 listings (strict laws 
severely restrict alcohol trade within and between states in the U.S.). Wine together with other 
alcoholic beverages and spirits comprise about half of all offers within the gourmet food/beverage 
category on the German site. Among the gourmet food categories auctioned on the German site, 
basic& specialty food, sweets & chocolates, and meats & sausages are roughly equal in importance. 
 
In terms of their suitability for online auction trading, we would expect that food product 
categories exhibiting a high degree of quality differentiation that are not commonly available in any 
next-door supermarket are most important. The value that buyers place on a food product purchased in 
an online auction must reflect a significant premium for exclusivity in order to justify shipping costs 
which in some instances even exceed the final auction price. This seems to be especially true for 
premium wine where many online auctions involve rare bottles that are not easily available anywhere 
else. Moreover, because of their often-perishable nature, we would expect that the possibilities to sell 
food products online are more restricted than for other goods. This expectation is reflected in the 
limited amount of perishable food products such as soft cheeses or raw meat on offer in online auction 
markets. However, when a food product has a significant degree of exclusivity for potential buyers and 
when it can easily be shipped to the buyer without deteriorating in quality, it may become sensible for 
sellers to offer it in an online auction. Hence, we do observe much larger online auction markets for 
gourmet food products such as smoked ham, dry cheeses or specialty coffees.  
 
 
4. Food Auction Data 
 
  We will now introduce a data set for a comparable sub-category of food, which was auctioned 
on the German eBay site. The data was collected with the objective to analyze the online auction 
mechanism for a sample food product category as well as potential determinants of final online auction 
prices. In order to obtain a reasonably sized data set of comparable food products, we choose three 
different specialty hams (Prosciutto di Parma, Jamón Serrano, Schwarzwälder Schinken), which were 
auctioned on the German eBay site during the months of December 2004 and January 2005. Note that 
all three names are protected geographical indications (GIs) in the European Union, either through 
protected designation of origin (PDO for Prosciutto di Parma and Schwarzwälder Schinken) or 
traditional specialty guaranteed (TSG for Jamón Serrano). However, due to the online nature of the 
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actually confirm to the quality regulations pertaining to these names.  
 
Table 2. Characteristics of the Data Set. 
   Parma  Serrano Schwarzw. Total 
Transactions (n)  618  621 260 1499 
Product value (€)  14787.97  16718.17 3314.62 34820.76 
Quantity sold (kg)  1884.17 2383.70 445.29 4713.16 
Total shipping costs (€)  4959.6  4955.3 1492.7 11407.60 
Av. product value (€/kg)  7.85  7.01 7.44 7.39 
Av. transaction value (€/n)  23.93  26.92 12.75 23.23 
Av. quantity sold (kg/n)  3.05  3.84 1.71 3.14 
Av. cost per shipment (€/n)  8.03  7.98 5.74 7.61 
Shipping cost per kg (€/kg)  2.63  2.08 3.35 2.42 
Number of bids placed  5631  4732 1714 12077 
Bids per transaction  9.1  7.6 6.6 8.1 
Source: www.eBay.de with own calculations. 
 
 
In Table 2, we provide some key characteristics of the data set including of 1499 transactions. 
The total product value for all transaction was 34820 €. Total quantity of ham traded was equal to 
4713 kg and about half of it was Jamón Serrano. On average, the shipping costs amount to about to ⅓ 
of the total product value.  The average product value (i.e. the average bid or willingness to pay per kg 
of product excluding shipping) is about 7.40€. It is highest for Parma (7.85€) and lowest for Serrano 
(7.01€), which is probably due to the fact that the auctioned Serrano ham has more bone more bone 
content than Parma and Schwarzwälder ham.  The average transaction value is 23.23€ (or 30.84€ 
including shipping). It is highest for Serrano (26.92€) and lowest for Schwarzwälder (12.75€). The 
average quantities sold are also very different mainly because Parma and Serrano are often sold as 
large chunks (also including bones) while Schwarzwälder is sold in smaller cuts without bones.  
Hence, we observe the lowest average cost per shipment (5.74€), but the highest shipping costs per kg 
(3.35 €/kg) for Schwarzwälder. With respect to the bidding behavior, we observe the most bids per 
transaction for Parma ham (9.1). This factor ought to contribute to the higher final auction prices per 
kg that is received for Parma, as we will analyze later.  
 
eBay allows auctions to last for 1, 3, 5, 7, or 10 days, but most of the auctions in the sample 
(about 80%) last for only one day with the remainder about evenly split between the other allowed 
auction periods. In any standard eBay auction, the seller must decide on an initial price as well as on a 
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time and day in advance. Thus, the timing of the auction end is of some relevance to the seller as it 
may affect the final bid, especially when buyers do not bid up to their maximum willingness to pay 
early in the auction, despite being encouraged to do so with proxy bidding. With respect to the auction 
end, the distribution is about uniform with around 215 +/– 20  transactions for each day during the 
week. Auction ending times are somewhat skewed towards the evening hours with about half of all 
auctions ending between 1800 and 2300 hour CET. With respect to initial pricing, about 80% of all 
sellers choose to start their auctions at minimum price which is equal to 1€. 
 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
 
In this section, we estimate two empirical models to analyze potential factors that may 
influence online buying behavior and may affect final online auction prices. We use the data set for 
specialty ham characterized above. Main quality attribute is a qualitative indicator that characterizes 
the type of ham (Prosciutto di Parma, Jamón Serrano, Schwarzwälder). Moreover, we have data on the 
weight of the ham auctioned, the number of bids place in the auction, the cost of shipping the product 
which is usually paid by the buyer, the length of the auction as well as the weekday and time during 
the day when the auction ended.  
 
For the first model [Log(Price)], we assume that buyers take the shipping costs as given. 
Hence, we relate final transaction values without shipping to a set of independent variables including a 
qualitative indicator for the type of ham, the product weight, the number of bids placed, the shipping 
costs, the auction length as well as qualitative indicators for the auction end (weekday and time during 
the day). For the second model [Log(Price+Ship)], we assume that buyers include shipping costs in 
deriving their maximum willingness to pay. Hence, we relate final transaction values plus shipping to 
the same set of independent variables – of course without including shipping as an independent 
variable. We can expect a positive sign on the estimated coefficients for weight and number of bids 
placed.  Higher shipping cost should have a negative impact on the final auction price. Moreover, as 
argued before, longer lasting auctions should attract more bidders and thus lead to higher prices. The 
results for both models are presented in Table 3. Note that in both models the base category is auctions 
for Schwarzwälder ending Sundays 8pm - 9pm. 
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expected, but the second model performs somewhat better in terms of the overall goodness of fit (R
2 = 
84.6%). The first model (R
2 = 79.5%) confirms that in an online auction, higher shipping costs have a 
significantly negative impact on the willingness to pay when buyers regard them as exogenous. In the 
following discussion, we will however focus on the second model because it seems more appropriate 
to assume endogenous shipping cost when their share of the total purchase price is about ⅓ on average 
and in some instances even exceeds the final bid. Relative to Schwarzwälder, Parma sells for a 
premium of 23.2% and Serrano at a premium of 14.6%. At the average transaction value of 30.84€ 
including shipping, another kilogram of product will add 5.74€ to the final bid. Note that the standard 
postal shipping rate in Germany (up to 5kg costs 7€) allows to add another kilogram of product to the 
average quantity sold in a transaction (3.14kg) without raising the shipping cost. The other coefficients 
may be interpreted as follows: an additional bid will add on average about 34¢ while another auction 
day will add only about 37¢ to the final auction price. Both of these values are very low and seem to 
support the observation that most auction only last for one day.  
 
Next, we turn to the effects related to the timing of the auction end. Our results suggest a 
negative weekend as opposed to Wood and Kauffman (2001). Auctions ending on a Friday (-6%) or 
Saturday (-3.7) both yield significantly lower final prices while all other days are not significantly 
different from Sundays. Since most people do their normal shopping on Fridays and Saturdays, they 
may be less inclined to follow an auction and/or shop for food online.  
 
With respect to the time of day an auction ends, our results are mixed. We have grouped 
sensible timeframes such as the night, morning and afternoon hours together when most people follow 
a certain daily routine. During the evening hours when most online auction trading takes place, we 
look at each hour separately. With the exception of the morning and late afternoon hours, all other 
timeframes carry a significant premium between 5% and 11% relative to the base period between 8pm 
and 9pm, during which about 1/7 of all auctions ended. When reflecting on this result, we notice that 
all significant price differentials are positive relative to the base period. This suggests that the expected 
prices are lower during the base period (8-9pm) as well as in the morning and late afternoon when 
potential buyer will most likely do other things than go online and bid in an auction. 
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†. 
Dependent Variable       LOG(PRICE)      LOG(PRICE+SHIP)   
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.    Coefficient t-Statistic  Prob. 
CONSTANT 2.207*** 22.842 0 2.462*** 43.849  0
PARMA 0.330*** 9.014 0 0.232*** 16.067  0
SERRANO 0.201*** 6.183 0 0.146*** 8.236  0
WEIGHT 0.266*** 19.332 0 0.186*** 38.896  0
NUMBER OF BIDS  0.017*** 7.651 0 0.011*** 6.995  0
SHIP -0.062*** -3.120 0.002 --- ---  ---
AUCTION LENGHT  0.016*** 3.841 0 0.012*** 3.549  0
MONDAY -0.005 -0.204 0.838 0.001 0.063  0.950
TUEDAY -0.002 -0.104 0.917 -0.005 -0.322  0.747
WEDNESDAY -0.004 -0.188 0.851 -0.002 -0.135  0.892
THURSDAY -0.012 -0.484 0.629 -0.012 -0.705  0.481
FRIDAY -0.085*** -3.133 0.002 -0.060*** -3.273  0.001
SATURDAY -0.049** -2.072 0.038 -0.037** -2.212  0.027
Time 23-08h  0.183*** 6.188 0 0.113*** 6.087  0
Time 08-12h  0.043 1.635 0.102 0.014 0.924  0.356
Time 12-17h  0.072*** 2.709 0.007 0.036** 2.288  0.022
Time 17-18h  0.106** 2.030 0.043 0.052 1.338  0.181
Time 18-19h  0.153*** 4.194 0 0.096*** 3.901  0
Time 19-20h  0.072** 2.150 0.032 0.038* 1.763  0.078
Time 21-22h  0.132*** 3.925 0 0.091*** 3.979  0
Time 22-23h  0.083*** 2.780 0.006  0.045** 2.418  0.016
R-squared 0.795    0.846   
Adjusted R-squared  0.792    0.845   
S.E. of regression  0.259    0.180   
S.D. dependent variable  0.568    0.457   
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.889        1.857     
 
† Least Squares with White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 




With our empirical model, we estimate significant relative price differences for the three types 
of ham analyzed. The domestic product (Schwarzwälder) although it may also exhibit a high degree of 
quality differentiation should be more commonly available in any next-door supermarket and thus does 
not exhibit the degree of exclusivity that online buyer will be looking for in order to be willing to pay a 
significant amount for having the product shipped to their home. As argued before, the value that 
buyers place on a food item purchased online must reflect a significant premium for exclusivity in 
order to justify shipping costs which in some instances may even exceed the final auction price. 
 
 
  126. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
  In this paper, we presented an introduction to online auction markets for food and beverage 
products and provided a brief overview of the types of products that are available in online auctions. 
Using a specific example of food items actually sold (three types of special quality ham differentiated 
by EU protected special nomenclature), we identified statistics on the volume and value of trade and 
the final auction prices received as well as indicators that characterize buyer bidding behavior. The 
ongoing dynamics of this developing market imply that we could only provide a one-time snapshot of 
a particular online auction food market exhibiting fairly active trading.  
 
To set the stage, we provided a brief review of the auction literature with a particular focus on 
recent research related to online auctions and discussed in some detail the format that is typically used 
in online auctions. We analyzed a detailed data set of the three specialty hams (Parma, Schwarzwälder, 
Serrano) protected geographical indications (GIs) in the European Union and auctioned on the German 
eBay site between December 6
th 2004 and January 6
th 2005. The final product value for all transactions 
in this data set was about 35000 € and the quantity traded just over 4700 kg. The average product 
value for a transaction was 23.23€ (30.84€ including shipping costs). 
 
Objective of the empirical analysis was to analyze potential factors that influence buying 
behavior and determine final online auction prices. Moreover, we suggest that using a hedonic model, 
auction data can be used to estimate a value for geographical indications (GIs). We estimate two 
different setups with the dependent variable modeling whether or not buyers include the shipping cost 
in their bidding decisions (i.e. maximum willingness to pay). We found that the domestic product in 
the sample (Schwarzwälder), although comparable in quality, is sold at a discount of 20-30% relative 
to the foreign product. We argue that this price differential is due to exclusivity effects. Comparable 
domestic products are widely available in any next-door supermarket and thus do not exhibit a 
significant degree of exclusivity that online buyer are looking for in order to be willing to pay the 
shipping cost which on average are about ⅓ of the final product value. 
 
Along with theoretical expectations, we estimate positive coefficients for weight and the 
number of bids placed in an auction. We also verify that higher shipping cost have a negative impact 
on the final auction price. Longer lasting auctions attract more potential buyers and thus lead to higher 
prices. Our data set confirms a positive but small auction length effect as suggested by Wood and 
Kaufmann (2001). We also estimate that lengthening an auction by one day would add about 37¢ to 
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are small and support the (observed) decision by sellers to offer mostly shorter auctions lasting only 
one day. However in contrast to other studies examining non-food items, our results suggest a negative 
weekend effect for food items. Auctions ending on Fridays and Saturdays both yield significantly 
lower final auction prices. We argue that during the weekend (especially Friday afternoon and 
Saturday morning), most Germans engage in their normal shopping routine and may be less inclined to 
follow an online auction and shop for something that they could also grab somewhere else.  
 
Finally, we obtained mixed results with respect to the time of day an auction ends. While we 
estimate significant differences between certain timeframes during the day, these effects may be 
mostly due to the readiness of buyers to go online and bid in an auction. This is suggested by fact that 
all estimated price differentials are positive relative to the base period between 8pm and 9pm when 
most people might want to do other more important things (e.g. eat, watch TV). 
 
This study represents a unique and first attempt to analyze online auction markets for food 
products. The results of this study yield some interesting conclusions with respect to online buying and 
bidding behavior. However, online auctions are a very dynamic market environment.  We reiterate that 
this analysis is only a one-time snapshot of an online auction market for a specific product group 
(specialty ham), which exhibited a fairly active trading during the period of data collection. Whether 
the more general results also hold for other quality differentiated food products sold in online auctions 
would warrant further studies. In particular, we would like to improve on this paper by studying 
further indicators of bidding behavior such as the impact of initial threshold pricing on the success of 
online auctions or whether late bidding influences online auction markets for food. Fortunately for 
economists, online auctions are a rich data source for empirical studies as well as a fascinating subject 
to study behavioral models in practice. 
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